This paper examines real exchange rate (RER) volatility in eighty countries around the world, during the period 1970 to 2011. Two main questions are raised: are structural breaks in RER volatility related to changes in exchange-rate regimes or financial crises?
Introduction
An important challenge to exchange rate theory is the solution to the puzzle that real exchange rates (RERs) are more volatile than what most models can account for.
Moreover, there is a great disagreement in the finance literature about the behaviour of nominal exchange rate volatility under alternative exchange rate arrangements. Flood and Rose (1995) highlight empirically a positive link between exchange rate volatility and flexible exchange rate regimes while Valachy and Kocenda (2003) find either positive or negative link according to the countries under investigation. Friedman (1953) argues that exchange rate volatility cannot be reduced by switching from floating to fixed exchange rates. Lastly, there is a strand of theoretical literature that supports that financial integration may reduce exchange rate volatility (see, for example, Obstfeld, 1984) , although the empirical studies on the effects of globalization on exchange rate volatility remain non-conclusive: while Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) showed that globalization lead to exchange rate fluctuations, Hau (2002) and Calderón (2004) find a positive effect of liberalization on the reduction of the RER volatility.
Moreover, Dornbusch et al. (1995) and De Gregorio et al. (2000) suggest that regardless of exchange regimes; financial integration can make countries vulnerable to the external shocks, while Coudert et al. (2011) show that, for most countries in their sample, exchange rate volatility increases more than proportionally with the global financial crises. This is especially relevant since, from a historical perspective, financial crises seem to be more like the rule rather than the exception (see Bordo et al., 2001 and Reinhart et al., 2010; among others) .
Since RER volatility has important implications for consumption, investment, economic growth, and trade flows (see Dellas and Zilberfarb, 1993; Campa and Goldberg, 1995; Darby et al., 1999; Frankel and Rose 2002; Broda and Romalis 2013; and Viera et al., 2013, among others) , establishing the relative importance of financial crises and exchange-rate regimes on RER volatility is a crucial question.
The majority of the existing literature investigates the effects of exchange rate volatility on a number of macroeconomic variables, e.g. growth (Bagella et al., 2006) or trade (Baum and Caglayan, 2010) . However, there is a lack of sufficient studies examining if changes in volatility are driven by changes in nominal exchange-rate regimes or financial crises.
Regarding previous evidence on this issue we can refer, among others, to Kocenda (2005) (who endogenously searches for the single most decisive structural break in exchange rate for a group of European transition countries, detecting breaks that are frequently associated with major changes in exchange rate regime), Balg and Mecalf (2010) (who investigate the impact of the volatility of the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals on exchange rate volatility, concluding that in the long run the volatility of the money supply is the sole determinant, whereas in the short run overshooting is found), Morales-Zumaquero and Sosvilla-Rivero (2010) (who examine the real exchange rate behaviour for a set of 22 OECD and 20 non-OECD countries during the 1960-2006 period, obtaining that there is clear evidence in favour of the non-neutrality of nominal exchange rate regime regarding real exchange rate volatility for developed countries, but not in the case of developing or emerging countries), Carrera and Vuletin (2013) (who examine a dataset for 63 countries over the period finding that alternative exchange rate regimes affect short-term real exchange rate volatility differently), and Caporale et. al (2013) (who find that external, real and monetary shocks can account for the volatility of real exchange rates in emerging economies, with international financial integration being a major driving force). This paper attempts to contribute to the empirical literature in this area raising two main questions: are structural breaks in RER volatility related to changes in exchange-rate regimes or financial crises? And do these two events affect the permanent and transitory components of RER volatility? To that end, we use a comprehensive data set including developed and developing countries for the 1970-2011 period, to examine whether the choice of exchange rate regime and the occurrence of a financial crisis are associated with structural breaks in RER volatility and whether they affect its permanent and transitory components.
In relation to the relevance of nominal exchange rate regimes and financial crises in explaining structural breaks in RER volatility, we use two econometric methods for testing for structural breaks: the OLS-based tests to endogenously detect multiple structural breaks, as proposed by Perron (1998, 2003) , and several procedures based on Information Criterion together with the so-called sequential procedure suggested by Bai and Perron (2003) . Once these structural breaks in RER volatility are detected, we examine if they are associated with major banking, currency and debt crises and whether they coincide with changes in nominal exchange rate regimes.
As for the evaluation of effects of nominal exchange rate regimes and financial crises on RER volatility, we use the component GARCH model proposed by Engle and Lee (1999) to decompose RER volatility into a permanent long-run trend component and a transitory short-run component that is mean-reverting towards the long-run trend.
Our results suggest that structural breaks in RER volatility coincide with financial crises and certain changes in nominal exchange-rate regimes. Moreover, our findings confirm that exchange rate volatility does increase with the global financial crises and suggest that the more flexible the exchange rate regime, the higher the volatility of the RER using a de facto exchange rate classification to capture the policies implemented by countries regardless of the regime reported by the country's authorities.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric methodology adopted in this study. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical result, and Section 4 offers some concluding remarks. Perron (1998, 2003) 
Econometric Methodology

Structural Breaks
To detect multiple structural breaks, we use the set of tests developed by Perron (1998, 2003) 
To run these tests it is necessary to decide the minimum distance between two consecutive breaks, h, that it, is obtain as the integer part of a trimming parameter, ε , multiplied by the number of observations T (we use 15 0. ε = and allow up to four breaks).
To select the dimension of the models, we follow the method suggested by Bai and Perron (1998) based on the sequential application of the sup ( )
1 Similarly, Stock and Watson (2002) use the absolute value of the fitted residuals of a VAR model to analyse changes in variance. Alternatively, Valentinyi-Endrész (2004) use the squared errors from a AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model to compute changes in variance. 2 For further analysis see Perron (1998, 2003) .
Permanent and Transitory Components
Engle and Lee (1999) proposed a "component-GARCH" (C-GARCH) model to decompose time-varying volatility into a permanent (long-run) and a transitory (shortrun) component.
Consider the original GARCH model:
As can be seen, the conditional variance of the returns here has mean reversion to some time-invariable value, ω . The influence of a past shock eventually decays to zero as the volatility converges to this value ω according to the powers of (α+β). The standard GARCH model therefore makes no distinction between the long-run and short-run decay behavior of volatility persistence.
For the permanent specification, the C-GARCH model replaces the time-invariable mean reversion value, ω , of the original GARCH formulation in equation (2) with a time variable component q t :
where, q t is the long-run time-variable volatility level, which converges to the long-run time-invariable volatility level ω according to the magnitude of ρ. This permanent component thus describes the long-run persistence behaviour of the variance. The longrun time-invariable volatility level ω can be viewed as the long-run level of returns variance for the relevant sector when past errors no longer influence future variance in any way. Stated differently, the value ω can be seen as a measure of the 'underlying' level of variance for the respective series. The closer the estimated value of the ρ in equation (7) is to one the slower q t approaches ω , and the closer it is to zero the faster it approaches ω . The value ρ therefore provides a measure of the long-run persistence.
The second part of C-GARCH model is the specification for the short-run dynamics, the behaviour of the volatility persistence around this long-run time-variable mean, q t :
According to this transitory specification, the deviation of the current condition variance from the long-run variance mean at time t (
) is affected by the deviation of the previous error from the long-run mean ) ( Given that the countries in our sample present different exchange rate regimes that can change under the period studied, we have used the "natural fine classification" of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) , updated to December 2010 by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) , to distinguish between a wide range of de facto regimes: 1) no separate legal tender; 2) pre announced peg or currency board arrangement; 3) pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%; 4) de facto peg; 5) pre announced crawling peg; 6) pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%; 7)
de factor crawling peg; 8) de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%; 9) pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to ±2%; 10) de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±5%; 11) moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time); 12) managed floating; 13) freely floating; 14) freely falling; 15) dual market in which parallel market data is missing.
As the tables in Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) provide monthly data until December 2010, we can identify the exact date of the change of regime. For 2011, we assume that there is not modification in the exchange rate regime.
Regarding the financial crisis dates, we make use of the information provided by Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart (2010) . The former covers all systemically important banking, currency and debt crises (hereafter SBC, CC and DC, respectively) for the period 1970 to 2007 for 261 countries, while the later offers the individual timeline of public and private debts, banking, sovereign domestic and external debt crises , and hyperinflation, for 70 countries, from their independence to 2010.
Empirical Results
Structural Breaks Results
Tables 1a-f present the detected numbers and dates of structural breaks 7 and their connection with an economic event for our examined set of countries. Recall that these breaks are searched endogenously from the data and our procedure does not rely on pretest information to determine them, thereby avoiding the possible problem of "data mining".
To facilitate the interpretation of Tables 1a-f, we have indicated with an arrow if volatility increases (↑) or decreases (↓) after the structural break identified as crisis episodes (i.e., systematic banking crisis, SBC; currency crisis, CC and debt crisis, DC).
As for the breakpoints associated with variations in the exchange rate regime (nominal exchange regime change, NERc), we have used the same convention, so an arrow pointing downwards (↓) would indicate the volatility decreases and an arrow pointing upwards (↑) would indicate the volatility decreases. Additionally, ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed regime to a more flexible one and ↓* indicates the volatility decreases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regime to a more fixed one. Moreover, in Tables 1a-f, there is a set of breaks that can be associated with specific economic events of each examined country (that we have denoted as country specific events, CSE).
[Tables 1a-f, here]
All in all, findings from our structural breaks analysis suggest several empirical regularities 8 . First, our results seem to indicate that exchange rate regimes do really matter, as we obtain evidence in favour of nominal regimes affecting RER variation.
Second, we detect, in almost all cases that the more flexible the exchange rate regime, the higher the volatility of the RER, as well as an increase in RER volatility after a financial crisis in almost all cases. Third, we document an alteration in the nominal exchange rate regime towards a more flexible one after the event of a crisis. 9 This result is in line with that of Fornaro (2011)'s, who claims the superiority of flexible exchange rate regimes compared to pegs both for the purpose of crisis times stabilization and as crises prevention devices. Finally, while two of the strongest financial crises, the Russian and Asian financial crises, have been detected using the procedure by Perron (1998, 2003) , there is no evidence of a significant change in RER volatility around 2007 or 2008 capturing the recent global financial crisis. This could be related to the fact that various countries made have interfered in foreign exchange markets (using intervention and capital controls) to restrain tensions in the foreign exchange markets (see, e. g., Deutsche Bundesbank, 2010) . Nevertheless, it is worth noting that institutional idiosyncrasies or major economic events are still at play, given the heterogeneity of break points detected across countries associated with country specific events. The reason for this heterogeneity is reserved for future research. 8 We summarize the results by pointing out the main regularities. The reader is asked to browse through Tables 1a to f to find evidence for particular countries or group of countries of her/his special interest and the respective estimated break points. A more detailed account of the results by groups of countries can be found in Morales-Zumaquero and Sosvilla-Rivero (2012). 9 Except for in Malaysia, Egypt and Senegal.
Permanent and Transitory Components Results
Tables 2a-f report coefficient estimates for the C-GARCH models obtained by maximum likelihood for each real exchange rate. Table 3 exhibits a summary of results with the numbers and percentages of significant coefficient estimates.
From these tables empirical results suggest a central message: evidence in favour that there exists a permanent-transitory component decomposition for our set of real exchange rates 10 . In addition, in order to evaluate the empirical relevance of our analysis, we compare the performance of the C-GARCH model to the GARCH model.
It is worth noting that the C-GARCH model reduces to the GARCH (1, 1) model either = =0 or = = 0. On the basis of Wald tests on these coefficients, we can see the null hypothesis is decisively rejected in almost all cases in favour of C-GARCH specification over the GARCH(1,1) specification, giving further support for our specification strategy.
[ Table 2a -f, here]
[ Table 3 , here]
From visual inspection of figures plotting the estimated of the total conditional variance and its two components (permanent and transitory), of the monthly difference in real exchange rate for all countries under study, two regularities seem to appear 11 : (1) there is a change in volatility when a financial crisis occurs: sometimes the permanent 10 This is the main regularity. The reader is asked to browse through Tables 2a to f and Table 3 to find evidence for particular countries or group of countries of her/his special interest. A more detailed account of the results by groups of countries can be found in Morales-Zumaquero and Sosvilla-Rivero (2012).
component has smooth movements around the total GARCH volatility while the transitory component raises and other times the three volatilities (the total GARCH permanent and transitory) move together during a financial crisis; and (2) it looks that the transitory component is much more volatile, responding largely to economic events.
Taken together, these findings imply that during financial crises, exchange rates are determined not only by traditional factors but also, to a major extent, by subjective perception of market participants.
Finally, and in line with Sarno and Valente (2006) , a pattern seems to emerge relating countries with long periods of fixed exchange rate regimes and higher degree of persistence in RER volatility.
[ Figures 1 to 6 , here]
We further analyse the connection between the behaviour of the permanent-transitory components with both the occurrence of a change in the nominal exchange rate regime and the existence of a SBC and/or a CC and/or a DC. Tables 4a-e and 5a-e show the results. In the first column of Tables 4a-e we present the dating of financial crises using the information provided by Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart (2010) . In the first column of Tables 5a-e we present the structural breaks associated with a change in the nominal exchange rate regime. In the second column of Tables 4 and 5 All in all, findings indicate that RER volatility change when there is a variation in the nominal exchange rate and after the occurrence of a financial crisis. Indeed, we observe that for almost all countries, and in almost all variations in the nominal exchange rate regime and financial crises, volatility equality tests reject the null hypothesis of equal variances. It is worth noting that for the European Union countries, there is some evidence in favour of a change in RER volatility during the recent global crisis in the cases of Belgium (a country with a high public debt to GDP ratio) and Spain (a country with a high deficit/GDP ratio).
To gain further insights in the behaviour of the permanent and transitory components of the conditional variance, we examine the correlation coefficients between each series.
The results, not shown here to save space but available from the authors upon request, suggest a limited degree of co-movement for the permanent components in all countries under study (with low correlation coefficients) and a still weaker correlations between the transitory components. There is only evidence of relevant correlations between the permanent components for European Union countries, suggesting the existence of some degree of commonality between them. This could be reflecting the closer economic and monetary cooperation between European countries that formally started in 1979 with the ERM and culminated in 1999 with the introduction of a single currency and a common monetary policy.
Concluding Remarks
Real exchange rate (RER) volatility is an issue of great importance to both businesses and policymakers. Empirical evidence of the existence of structural breaks in financial time series made this area of research very active in the recent years. Much of attention in the literature has been given to structural breaks in volatility, which imply changes in the risk behaviour of investors due to important financial events, such as the 1987 stock market crash, the dot-com bubble in 1995-2000 and the subprime mortgage crisis.
The purpose of our paper has been to contribute to the debate on a possible relationship between structural breaks in RER volatility and changes in exchange-rate regimes or financial crises. To that end, using data for the period 1970 to 2011, we have first examined the instability in terms of multiple structural breaks in the variance in the time series of eighty countries compromising American, European, Middle East, Oceania, Asian and African countries. In particular, we have presented the results of applying two alternative procedures for searching endogenously without using a priori information: the OLS-based tests to detect multiple structural breaks, proposed by Perron (1998, 2003) and several procedures based on Information Criterion joint with the so called sequential procedure suggested by Bai and Perron (2003) . We then employ the component GARCH model proposed by Engle and Lee (1999) to decompose volatility into a permanent long-run trend component and a transitory shortrun component that is mean-reverting towards the long-run trend.
The main results are as follows. Firstly, we found substantial evidence of structural breaks in volatility across investigated RER. Secondly, there is high heterogeneity between series regarding the dates in which the break points are located, although major financial crises seem to coincide with most of them. Thirdly, and in line with previous empirical research, we document higher RER volatility under flexible exchange rate regimes using a de facto exchange rate classification to correct for possible inconsistencies between the commitment of the central bank and its observed behaviour.
This finding could be related to the relative sluggishness in price adjustment see-e. e. g, Mussa, 1986; Baxter and Stockman 1989; Flood and Rose, 1995; Ghosh et al. 1997; Liang 1998) or could derived from a greater incidence of real and nominal shocks under flexible regimes (see Stockman 1983; Grilli and Kaminsky 1991; Clarida and Gali 1994; and Rogers 1999, among others) . Finally, the decomposition of total volatility into its components suggest that the permanent component tracks total RER volatility reflecting the evolution of fundamental factors and the transitory component responds largely to market expectations, rising during the detected structural breaks.
Finally, regarding financial crisis, our results suggest that, in a context of increasing interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets, RER volatility is exacerbated during crisis periods. Perron (1998, 2003) . b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. d. ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed regime to a more flexible one and ↓* indicates the volatility decreases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. Perron (1998, 2003) . b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; RFC: Russian Financial Crisis; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis; EMSC: European Monetary System Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. d. ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed regime to a more flexible one and ↓* indicates the volatility decreases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. Perron (1998, 2003) . b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. d. ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed regime to a more flexible one and ↓* indicates the volatility decreases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. Perron (1998, 2003) . b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. d. ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed regime to a more flexible one and ↓* indicates the volatility decreases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. Perron (1998, 2003) . b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; AFC: Asian Financial Crisis; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. d. ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed regime to a more flexible one and ↓* indicates the volatility decreases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. Perron (1998, 2003) . b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. d. ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed regime to a more flexible one and ↓* indicates the volatility decreases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. b. The long-run and short-run half-lives are measured using the following formulae: SBC: 1981 SBC: , 1994 CC: 1977 CC: , 1982 CC: , 1995 DC: 1982 DC: 1977 SBC: 2003; CC: 1985 CC: , 1990 CC: , 2003 DC: 1982 DC: , 2003 DC: 1982 SBC: 1996; CC: 1978 CC: , 1991 DC: 1978 DC: 1978 SBC: 1977; CC: 1975 CC: , 1980 CC: , 1985 CC: 1975 
